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  Introduction
In this paper we consider the nature of machine proofs used in the CSP
approach to the verication of authentication protocols
In Sch	
 a general method is presented for the analysis and verica
tion of authentication protocols using the process algebra CSP Hoa
 The
CSP syntax provides a natural and precise way to describe such protocols
in terms of the messages accepted and transmitted by the individual pro
tocol participants The CSP traces model provides a formal framework for
reasoning about these protocols
In the CSP method authentication is considered to be messageoriented
m authenticates m if the receipt of m guarantees the previous transmis
sion of m even in a hostile environment To facilitate proofs a notion of a
rank function is developed in Sch	
 This is an integervalued function on
the message space such that all messages apart from m which could possi
bly circulate in the network have a rank greater than zero and the message
which provides authentication m above has a rank of zero or below It is
then sucient to prove that no messages of rank zero or below are able to
circulate when message m is blocked
However proving authentication is still an arduous task The principal
problem is in the complexity of the message space which gives rise to a
mass of detail in proofs requiring a signicant amount of detailed house
keeping For this reason the CSP traces theory has been embedded within
PVS DSa SOR
 and this description has been successfully used to
mechanise several proofs of authentication properties DSb BS
 How
ever even with mechanical support the construction of proofs is far from
easy because of the inherent complexity involved in modelling all the pos
sibilities of malicious action
In this paper we consider a novel authentication protocol proposed
in BO
 The protocol can be used in various ways we take the purpose
to be that of establishing an uncompromised chain of session keys between
adjacent pairs of agents involved in the protocol run
This protocol provides an interesting extension to the work cited above

because very few aspects of an individual protocol run are xed in advance
There may be an arbitrary number of agents and consequently there may
be an arbitrary number of messages which may grow to arbitrary lengths
Despite the extra complexity of the protocol adapting the techniques
developed in DSa
 to prove that the session keys are uncompromised
turned out to be relatively straightforward and the proofs of authentication
were not signicantly more complex We present the rank function used and
show how PVS uses the rank function to prove the authentication property
In RS
 an attack is described on an implementation of this protocol
and a correction is proposed We go on to identify where the particular im
plementation decisions made compromised the protocol and how the proof
of authentication for the original denition of the protocol fails when applied
to the faulty implementation We also provide an analysis of the corrected
protocol and verify that the attack is no longer possible Finally we spec
ulate on how failed proofs may lead us to discover attacks
 CSP
In Sch	
 a general framework for analysing security properties within the
process algebra CSP is presented Only a limited number of CSP operators
are necessary If a is a CSP event A a set of events and P and Q CSP
processes then the prex operator a   P describes a process which performs
an a and then behaves as process P  The choice operator P   Q describes
a process which oers a choice between process P and process Q  and it
has an indexed form
 
a A
P
a
 which oers a choice between all of the
processes P
a
 The choice is resolved by the rst action to occur The parallel
operator P jA 
jQ forces P and Q to synchronise on actions from the set
A but otherwise execute independently The hiding operator P n A hides
the events in set A which means that no other process can participate in
occurrences of these events The atomic process Stop marks the termination
of a process
  Traces
In Sch	
 the traces model is used as the basis for the proof rules presented
In this model the semantics of a process P is dened to be the set of traces
sequences of events that it may possibly perform For example
tracesa   b   Stop  fhi  hai  ha  big
tracesa   b   Stop j fbg 
j b   c   Stop  fhi  hai  ha  bi  ha  b  cig

A useful operator on traces is projection If D is a set of events then
the trace tr   D is dened to be the maximal subsequence of tr all of whose
events are drawn from D  If D is a singleton set fdg then we overload
notation and write tr   d for tr   fdg Message extraction tr  C for a set
of channel names C provides the maximal sequence of messages passed on
channels C  Finally tr  C provides the set of messages in tr passed along
some channel in C  These may be described inductively on sequences and
the last by a set comprehension
hi   D  hi
hdi
a
tr   D 
 
hdi
a
tr   D if d  D
tr   D otherwise
hi  C  hi
hdi
a
tr  C 
 
hmi
a
tr  C  if  c  C  d  cm
tr  C  otherwise
tr  C  fm j tr  C    m  hig
If tr is a sequence then tr is the set of events appearing in the
sequence The operator  extends to processes P is the set of events
that appear in some trace of P 
In the traces model if tracesQ  tracesP then we say that Q is a
renement of P  written P v Q 
 The protocol
In BO
 an authentication protocol is proposed which is further explained
in Pau
 This protocol operates over an arbitrarily long chain of protocol
agents terminating with a keyserver We set out to verify that a run of
the protocol establishes an uncompromised chain of session keys between
adjacent pairs of agents The protocol operates as follows where HashX
is the hash of a message X and Mac
K
X is the pair fHashfK  X g X g In
the protocol description K will be an agents longterm shared key and the
hashed message HashfK  X g  a message authentication code will allow the
server to check that message X originated with the owner of key K  K
x
is
the longterm key of agent X  K
xy
is a session key between agent X and
agent Y  N
x
is a fresh nonce and null is a placeholder
Agent A initiates a run by sending the following message
A  B  Mac
K
a
fA B  N
a
  nullg

Agent B responds by sending a similar message to agent C  but replacing
the placeholder with As entire message
B   C  Mac
K
b
fB  C  N
b
 Mac
K
a
fA B  N
a
  nullgg
This step is repeated for each subsequent agent in the chain and each agent
adds new components to the message and passes it on This stage termi
nates when some agent species the server as the recipient Suppose for
example that C sends the message to the server
C   S  Mac
K
c
fC  S  N
c
 Mac
K
b
fB  C  N
b
 Mac
K
a
fA B  N
a
  nullggg
The server now unpacks this message and prepares session keys for each
adjacent pair of agents in the chain Considering the outer two levels of the
protocol we can see that agent C was called by agent B  and called agent
S the server The server therefore generates the session keys K
bc
and
K
cs
 prepares two certicates and encrypts them with agent C s secret key
fK
cs
 S  N
c
g
K
c
and fK
bc
 B  N
c
g
K
c
 In a sense the key K
cs
is redundant
because agent C has a key with the server already  its longterm key K
c

However including it allows the nal agent in the chain to be treated like
any other agent
Ignoring the rst level of the message now and considering the second
and third levels the server creates two certicates for agent B  fK
bc
 C  N
b
g
K
b
and fK
ab
 A N
b
g
K
b
 encrypted with agent B s secret key
The third level of the message contains the placeholder null which in
dicates to the server that this is the last level of the message It therefore
prepares only one further certicate fK
ab
 B  N
a
g
K
a

In the next step the server returns the all certicates to the last agent
on the chain
S   C  fK
cs
 S  N
c
g
K
c
  fK
bc
 B  N
c
g
K
c
  fK
bc
 C  N
b
g
K
b
 
fK
ab
 A N
b
g
K
b
  fK
ab
 B  N
a
g
K
a
Agent C removes the relevant certicates and forwards the rest to agent B
which in turn passes the nal one on to agent A
C   B  fK
bc
 C  N
b
g
K
b
  fK
ab
 A N
b
g
K
b
  fK
ab
 B  N
a
g
K
a
	B   A  fK
ab
 B  N
a
g
K
a

 CSP Description
The datatype used to model the possible messages is given by
MESSAGE  TEXT j NONCE j USER j KEY j
MESSAGE MESSAGE j
encryptKEY  MESSAGE  j
hashKEY  MESSAGE 
where TEXT  NONCE  and USER are all primitive sets The set KEY
further subdivides into SESSION and LONGTERM  representing two dif
ferent ways in which keys are used typically session keys are only used for
a single run of the protocol whereas longterm keys are used repeatedly
KEY  SESSION j LONGTERM
If m m
 
 m

are arbitrary messages and k is a key then the generates
relation  for this message space is dened by the following rules
	 m  S
	 
m

 S

S  m

  S

 m  S  m
	 S  m
 
 S  m

 S  m
 
m

	 S  m
 
m

 S  m
 
 S  m

	 S  m  S  k  S  encryptk  m
	 S  k  S  encryptk  m  S  m
	 S  m  S  k  S  hashk  m
Observe that hashing is oneway there is no rule which allows informa
tion to be extracted from a hashed message Observe also that all keys in this
protocol are symmetric knowledge of a key allows any message encrypted
with that key to be decrypted
The protocol describes the required behaviour of each of its participants
We will use CSP processes to describe the behaviour of each of the partici
pating agents For simplicity we will consider in this paper a single run of
the protocol though the approach extends naturally to multiple concurrent
runs as discussed in Sch	

We model an agent i as sending all of its messages on to the medium
and receiving all its messages from the medium through the channels transi
and reci respectively as illustrated in Figure 

USERa USERb
MEDIUM
USER m...
trans.a
rec.a
trans.b
rec.b
trans.m
rec.m
Figure  CSP model of the network
Messages on these channels have the type USERUSERMESSAGE 
where USER is the set of all protocol agents names transi j m represents
the transmission onto the medium of message m from USER
i
addressed to
USER
j
 and reci j m represents the reception of message m by USER
i
 la
belled as coming from USER
j
 The message m is drawn from the abstract
datatype MESSAGE  The users are dened according to the protocol that
we are analysing
The initiator of the protocol agent A is described as
USER
A
 transAB maclt
A
 AB N
A
null  
recABencryptlt
A
  sB N
A
  Stop
where N
A
is a fresh nonce Agent A transmits an initiating request to agent
B on channel transA and awaits a reply on channel recA
The freshness of N
A
is modelled by the fact that it is not initially known
by the enemy N
A
 INIT  where INIT will be used to model the informa
tion known by the enemy at the start of the protocol run
After sending out the initial request the process is prepared to accept
any message which is labelled as coming from B  is encrypted with its long
term key and contains both its nonce challenge N
A
and the agent B s iden
tity It will accept the key s as a session key generated by the server for
private use between A and B 
Intermediate nodes along the chain all have the same form If the node
next up the chain from B is C then the appropriate description is as follows
USER
B
 recBimaclt
k
  i B N
x
m  
transB C maclt
B
 B C N
B
maclt
k
  i B N
x
m  
recB C encryptlt
B
  skupC N
B
encryptlt
B
  skdowni N
B
x  
transB i x   Stop
	
Agent B receives a request from some agent which it packages suitably
and sends on to its successor Agent C in this case It then receives a
message consisting of a list of key certicates The rst two certicates
contain sessions keys for communication with the agent immediately below
skdown and above skup The rest of the message is passed to the agent
i from whom the original request was received
The server inputs a message which consists of a nested series of requests
and then outputs a message which is a concatenation of all of the key cer
ticates encrypted for the appropriate agents
SERVER  recSim   transS i responsem   Stop
The function response dened on the possible legitimate requests that may
arrive at the server is dened inductively as follows
responsemaclt
i
  i j N
i
null  encryptlt
i
  s
ij
j N
i

responsemaclt
j
  j k N
j
maclt
i
  i j N
i
x  
encryptlt
j
  s
jk
k N
j
encryptlt
j
  s
ij
i N
j
responsemaclt
i
  i j N
i
x 
The session keys s
ij
generated by the server are all fresh and unguessable
none appear in the set INIT 
The protocol operates in a hostile environment This is also modelled
within CSP in order to facilitate analysis The approach taken is to provide
a CSP description of the DolevYao model DY
 In this model it is
assumed that the medium is under the complete control of the enemy which
can block readdress duplicate and fake messages
The network description consists of a set of user processes which exe
cute the protocol an intruder process and a medium which carries all the
messages
As is pointed out in Sch	
 the medium and intruder can be rewritten
as a single process ENEMY 
ENEMY S   transij m   ENEMY S  fmg
 
 
i j USER Sm
reci j m   ENEMY S 
This is the description we shall use through this paper ENEMY  ENEMY INIT 
where INIT does not contain N
A
 N
B
 K
a
 K
b
or K
ab

Although this description looks simple it is powerful enough to model all
aspects of the DolevYao model in that it can block duplicate reorder or
fake messages All attacks involving these operations are therefore possible
within the model

 Authentication
In the CSP traces model properties are given as predicates on traces and
a process P satises a specication S if all of its traces satisfy S 
P sat S  
 tr  tracesPS
In the traces model we say that P is a renement of Q written Q v P
if tracesQ  tracesP and from this denition it follows that
P v Q  P sat S  Q sat S
We use this messageoriented approach in dening authentication a set
of messages T authenticates a set of messages R if the receipt of a message
in set T guarantees the previous transmission of a message in set R As a
predicate on traces this is dened
T authenticates R  tr   R  hi  tr   T  hi
If it is not possible for a trace tr to contain a message from the set T without
also containing a message from the set R then we can be sure that a message
from set R was transmitted onto the network before T could be received
In this paper the property we choose to prove is that the message
recb  i   cryptolongtermltb  concS   Ia  Nb
authenticates
ftranss  j   x cryptolongtermltb  concS   Ia Nbyg
where S is an arbitrary session key That is if agent B receives from
anywhere a message encrypted with his longterm key and containing a
session key S  a neighbours identity and his original nonce challenge he
can be sure that that message originated from the server
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the denition
Lemma 
P sat T authenticates R  P jR 
j Stop sat tr   T  hi
This follows from the fact that the process P jR 
j Stop is unable to
perform any events from the set R Thus to prove that
P sat T authenticates R

it is sucient to prove that P jR 
jStop sat tr   T  hi This is the
approach we will use in paper
The CSP traces model has a sound and complete set of rules for proving
that processes satisfy specications which could be used here but we prefer
to develop a set of rules specic to our application which will enable us to
reason at a more appropriate level of abstraction Those used in this paper
are given in Figure 
The soundness of the rules follows from the trace semantics of the opera
tors and the formal denition of T authenticates R They have been proven
in PVS DSa
 We may give informal justication of their soundness by
considering that occurrence of an event from T is intended to provide evi
dence that some event from R previously occurred Hence a process fails to
satisfy T authenticates R only when some event from T occurs before some
event from R
Rule authstop is therefore sound because Stop cannot perform any
events at all and so cannot perform some T before some R
Rule authprefix is sound because if the very rst event a performed
by a   P is an event from R then it is not possible for an event from T
to occur before an event from R This is independent of the nature of the
subsequent process P  which therefore has no restrictions placed on it by
the rulethe rule is applicable for any process P 
Rule authprefix is most useful when the event a is not in R since
otherwise authprefix is applicable In this case it states that if the rst
event is not in T  then occurrence of a is irrelevant to authentication of
R by T  and such authentication is guaranteed for a   P whenever it is
guaranteed for P 
Rule authchoice states that if each branch of a choice guarantees the
authentication property T authenticates R then so does the entire choice
since whenever some event from T occurs it must have been performed
by one of the arms of the choice and that choice must previously have
performed some event from R
Rule authparallel states that if a single component P of a parallel
combination is able to guarantee that T authenticates R and it is involved
in all occurrences of events from T and R then that is enough to ensure
that the entire parallel combination P jA 
jQ guarantees it since P will
not allow any event from T to occur before an event from R occurs There
are no restrictions on the rest of the system Q  so the rule holds for any
process description Q 

Rule authstop
Stop sat T authenticates R
Rule authprefix
 a  R 

a   P sat T authenticates R
Rule authprefix
P sat T authenticates R
 a  T 

a   P sat T authenticates R
Rule authchoice

 j V
j
sat T authenticates R
 
j
V
j
sat T authenticates R
Rule authparallel
P sat T authenticates R
 R  T   A 

P jA 
jQ sat T authenticates R
Rule authinterleaves
P sat T authenticates R
Q sat T authenticates R
P jjj Q sat T authenticates R
Rule authrecursion

 k X
k
sat T authenticates R

 k F
k
X  sat T authenticates R
 
 k X
k
b F
k
X  


 k X k sat T authenticates R
Figure  Proof rules for authentication

Rule authinterleaves states that if both components of an interleaved
combination can guarantee T authenticates R then the combination itself
can This follows from the fact that if some event from T occurs then it
must have been performed by one of the component processes which must
have previously performed an event from R
Finally the rule authrecursion for mutually recursive processes states
that if the property T authenticates R is preserved by recursive callsif each
variable X
k
sat T authenticates R then so does each function F
k
X  applied
to the variablesthen the processes dened by the mutual recursion satisfy
the property T authenticates R
 A key theorem
We obtain an extremely specialised theorem that applies to authentication
properties on this specic description NET of the network This theorem
is at the heart of the proof strategy presented in this paper It provides
a sucient list of conditions whose achievement guarantees that NET sat
T authenticates R
Theorem    MESSAGE   Z is such that
C 
m  INIT m  
C 
m

 S m

    S  m  m  
C 
m  T m  
C 
 i USER
i
jR 
j Stop sat maintains 
then NET jR 
jStop sat tr   T  hi
The rank function  is intended to have positive value on all messages which
can be generated by some agent including the enemy during a run of the
protocol when all messages in the set R are prevented from occurring The
intention is to show that this restriction on R means that no event from T
can occur and hence by Lemma  that T authenticates R Conditions C
and C together mean that if the enemy only ever sees messages of positive
rank then he can only ever generate messages of positive rank
Condition C states that the same is true for the users of the network
when restricted on R they never output a message of nonpositive rank
unless they previously received such a message The specicationmaintains 
is dened as
maintains tr b

m  tr  rec  m   
m  tr  trans  m  

If every message received on rec has positive rank then so does every mes
sage sent out on trans
The predicate m   can therefore be seen as describing an in
variant at every stage of the protocols execution when R is suppressed it
must hold of the next message Since C states that it does not hold for
any message in T  this means that no message in T can ever be generated
The problem for any particular protocol and a particular authentication
property expressed in terms of R and T  is to nd an appropriate rank
function  which makes C to C all true and to verify this fact
 Translating to PVS notation
In DSa
 an embedding of CSP in PVS is presented precisely for mecha
nising the proofs necessary with this approach CSP traces are represented
as lists a predened notion in PVS Processes are described as sets of traces
The CSP operators are then dened as trace combinators For example the
choice operator   returns the union of its two arguments
Since a process P satises a predicate E i all its traces satisfy E  a
satisfaction operator  can be dened so that P  E provided P is a
subset of E 
The DolevYao framework has already been translated into PVS DSa
BS
 so all that was required was to dene the message space and the
protocol agents
The message space was dened as
message  DATATYPE WITH SUBTYPES nonkey key
BEGIN
text 	x
text  Text  text  nonkey
nonce 	x
nonce  Nonce  nonce  nonkey
user 	x
user  Identity  user  nonkey
conc 	x
conc y
conc  message  conc  nonkey
session 	x
session  SessionKey  session  key
longterm 	x
longterm  LongTerm  longterm  key
code 	x
code  key y
code  message  code  nonkey
hash 	x
hash  key y
hash  message  hash  nonkey
END message
The message authentication code is dened by
mac	k m  message  conc	hash	k m m

The enemy may deduce certain information from the messages it sees
This deductive ability given by  in the CSP model is transcribed into PVS
by the Gen relation
GenSm  INDUCTIVE bool 
 Sm
 OR EXISTS m m	 GenSm AND GenSm	 AND m  concm m	
	 OR EXISTS m GenSconcm m

 OR EXISTS m	 GenSconcm m	
 OR EXISTS m k GenSm AND GenSk AND m  cryptok m
 OR EXISTS k GenSk AND GenScryptok m
 OR EXISTS m k GenSm AND GenSk AND m  hashk m
Any message already known to the enemy is considered to be part of
the generated set line  The enemy may concatenate messages or split
concatenated messages lines  If it is in possession of a key and an
arbitrary message it may encrypt the message with the key line  Since
all keys are symmetric if it owns a key and a message encrypted with that
key it may decrypt the message line  Finally if it owns a key and an
arbitrary message it may form the hash of the message with respect to the
key line 	 The transitivity requirement is implicit because m m and k
are quantied over GenS
With these in place it now remains to prove that each of the protocol
participants maintain rank This means that if the CSP description of an
individual participant is restricted so it cannot transmit any messages from
the set R then it is unable to transmit the message T  The contrapositive
of this says that if the message T is observed on the medium it must have
been preceded by an event from the set R
We need to dene an operator crypto which will encrypt and decrypt
messages
crypto	k m  message 
CASES m OF
code	x y 
CASES k OF
longterm	i IF x  longterm	i THEN y ELSE code	k m ENDIF
session	i IF x  session	i THEN y ELSE code	k m ENDIF
ENDCASES
ELSE code	k m
ENDCASES

It applies the function code returning the original message if the key
has been applied twice to the same message
In the following denitions lt is an abbreviation for the function which
returns the longterm key of a user i and sk	ij returns the session key
for i and j
The rst user is dened as
userA  processevent 
Choice skey 
	 trans	a b mac	lt	a conc	Ia Ib Na null 
	 rec	a b crypto	lt	a conc	skey Ib Na 
Stopevent 
The Choice skeymeans that in the second part of the denition agent
A is prepared to accept an arbitrary session key provided that it forms part
of a certicate encrypted with its longterm key and contains his original
nonce
The denition of userB is similar except that it rst waits for a message
from userA then uses that message instead of the placeholder  It also
expects two messages each containing a single key certicate and does not
pass anything on to the lower members of the chain These changes were
necessitated by the denition of the server
userB  processevent 
Choice ltk Nx m skup skdown i k 
	rec	b i mac	ltk conc	user	i Ib Nx m 
	 trans	b k mac	lt	b conc	Ib user	k Nb
mac	ltk conc	user	i Ib Nx m 
	 rec	b k crypto	lt	b conc	skup user	k Nb 
	 rec	b k crypto	lt	b conc	skdown user	i Nb 
Stopevent 
The denition of the server diers in some ways from its CSP denition
In the CSP denition the server receives one message and sends out one
message However a denition of this form would require the denition of
response to be incorporated into the denition of the server This would
require signicant extra complexity in the PVS coding It proved easier to
make use of the assumptions of the DolevYao model
Since the medium is entirely in the control of the enemy who may re
order redirect or kill messages arbitrarily we do not need to dene the
server to recurse on a single message to produce all the certicates The

inner layers of the message have already been circulating in the medium
and we may therefore rely on the medium to pass these on to the server as
appropriate
This is not as radical an assumption as it may seem and it introduces no
further attacks on the protocol The medium may already destroy any run
of the protocol by refusing to pass on messages But what we are interested
in are safety properties if a protocol run completes successfully then we
want to be sure that the session keys are uncompromised Provided it is
possible for a single run to complete successfully we are not interested in
any incomplete runs
In this description the server receives a message which either has at least
two levels of message authentication codes or contains the placeholder null
The two parts of the denition result from the pattern matching that occurs
on the rst message It the message contains at least two levels of message
authentication codes then the server prepares and sends the appropriate two
key certicates These are addressed direct to the intended recipient since
our enemy may arbitrarily redirect messages nothing is gained by insisting
that they pass through all members of the chain
If the incoming message contains the placeholder null then only one
certicate is necessary
Fs	X  processevent 
	Choice m Nix Njx i j k l 
	rec	slmac	lt	j conc	user	j user	k Njx
mac	lt	i conc	user	i user	j Nix m 
	 trans	s j crypto	lt	j conc	sk	jk user	k Njx 
	 trans	s j crypto	lt	j conc	sk	ji user	i Njx 
X

	Choice Nix i j l 
	 rec	s l mac	lt	i conc	user	i user	j Nix null 
	 trans	s l mac	lt	i conc	user	i user	j Nix null 
	 Stopevent
server  processevent  mu	Fs
 The authentication property
Recall that we wish to prove that for any i and S  the message T
recb  i   encryptlongtermltb  concS   Ia Nb

authenticates R
ftranss  j   encryptlongtermltb  concS   Ia Nbg
We now have to dene a rank function which must assign a rank of  or
above to allow messages which may possibly circulate in the network and a
rank of  or below to all messages which may not circulate in the network
The rank function we used is given in Figure  The rank of all text
nonces and user identities is one All session keys apart from the one between
A and B have rank one and all longterm keys have rank one apart from
the ones belonging to A B and the server All hashed messages have a rank
of one Encrypted messages have the same rank as the message itself unless
it is encrypted with either A or B s longterm key All messages encrypted
with either A or B s longterm key have rank one greater than the message
itself except for the authenticating message
Proving that each of the processes maintains rank is very straightforward
The proof consists mainly of PVS macro steps developed specically for
authentication protocols and presented in DSa
 The run times on a
Sparc  to check the proofs once they were developed were userA took 
seconds userB took  seconds and server took  seconds
 Incorrect Implementation
In RS
 an attack on an implementation of the recursive authentication
protocol is described The implementation decision which leads to the attack
is straightforward The server computes the certicates as K
ab
L
Hash
K
a
fNag
where 
L
 represents the bitwise XOR of two bit strings
To see that this is insecure note that with three agents in the chain
the server returns certicates of the form
K
ab
L
Hash
K
a
fNag K
ab
L
Hash
K
b
fNbg 
K
bc
L
Hash
K
b
fNbg K
cs
L
Hash
K
c
fNcg 
Anyone in possession of these certicates and they are all broadcast
across the network can compute xord pairs of session keys as
K
ab
L
Hash
K
b
fNbg
L
K
bc
L
Hash
K
b
fNbg  K
ab
L
K
bc
Thus if the enemy knows one session key he may compute all others
	
rho	m  RECURSIVE int 
CASES m OF
text	z  
nonce	z  
user	z  
session	z  IF session	z  session	sk	a b THEN 
ELSE  ENDIF
longterm	z  IF z  lt	a OR z  lt	b OR z  lt	s THEN 
ELSE  ENDIF
conc	z z  min	rho	z rho	z
hash	q z  
code	q z  rank
code	q z rho	z
ENDCASES
MEASURE size	m
rank
code	q m n  int 
CASES q OF
session	z n
longterm	j 
IF jlt	a THEN rank
lt
a	m n
ELSIF jlt	b THEN rank
lt
b	m n
ELSE n
ENDIF
ENDCASES
rank
lt
a	m n  int  n
rank
lt
b	m n  int 
IF m  conc	session	sk	ab Ia Nb THEN  ELSE n ENDIF
Figure  The Rank Function

 PVS analysis
Although we knew the aw in this protocol before beginning the analysis
we proceeded with a mechanical analysis to see where it broke down and
whether we could make any deductions from that
In fact the aw revealed itself very quickly The new generates function
which includes XOR is given by
Gen	S	m  INDUCTIVE bool 
S	m
OR 	EXISTS m m  Gen	S	m AND Gen	S	m AND m  conc	m m
OR 	EXISTS m  Gen	S	conc	m m
OR 	EXISTS m  Gen	S	conc	m m
OR 	EXISTS m  Gen	S	m AND m  hash	m
OR 	EXISTS m m  Gen	S	m AND Gen	S	m AND m  xor	m m
OR 	EXISTS m  Gen	S	m AND Gen	S	xor	m m
OR 	EXISTS m  Gen	S	m AND Gen	S	xor	m m
It is impossible to prove that the blank rank function
rho	m  RECURSIVE int 
CASES m OF
text	z  
nonce	z  
user	z  
session	z  IF session	z  session	sk	a b THEN  ELSE  ENDIF
longterm	z  IF z  lt	a OR z  lt	b THEN  ELSE  ENDIF
conc	z z min	rho	z rho	z
hash	z  
xor	z z  
ENDCASES
MEASURE size	m
is valid in other words an attempted proof of

S  m  positive S   S j m m  
fails It requires a sublemma

m m  m    m
L
m   m  
and the counterexample is that s
ab
   since it is secret but the enemy
may know s
bc
 since he may be masquerading as agent C  and s
ab
L
s
bc
is

also known since it circulates in the network so the proof of the sublemma
fails
Other rank functions could be tried in which case the proof would fail
at some other stage
  Corrected Implementation
The corrected implementation proposed in RS
 is a very simple extension
of the incorrect version They suggest that the server return certicates of
the form
K
ab
L
Hash
Kb
fNb Ag K
bc
L
Hash
Kb
fNb Cg
which does indeed provide secure session keys between pairs of honest agents
This has now been proven for the most general case when A B and the
server are honest
 Dealing with failed proofs
One of the less intuitive parts of the proof method outlined above is the rank
function It is not easy to tell at a glance whether a particular rank function
will work or not and if a proof fails it is not necessarily obvious whether
this is because the protocol is awed or because the rank function was in
appropriate To some extent improvements on a awed rank function may
be deduced by considering the PVS output After applying the macro steps
we can reduce nontrivial sequents to their component parts using grind
which gives us a list of consequents and antecedents The antecedents origi
nate essentially from the information that the rank function provides about
messages which have already been observed in the network
If none of the consequents follow from the antecedents
 
 then it is some
times possible to deduce a strengthening of the rank function by observing
the consequents Further protocol verication attempts are required in order
to develop heuristics for this
 
PVS requires only that one consequent be proved in order to prove the sequent

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